[2010] UKFTT 243
(TC)

TC00540
Appeal number
VAT – MTIC fraud – transaction
connected with fraud? – yes – appellant should have known? – yes - input tax
recovery denied – appeal dismissed.
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
ROMA
II LTD Appellant
-
and -
TRIBUNAL: Richard
Barlow (Judge)
Mrs
M Kostick (Member)
Sitting in public in
Mr Vivek Nayar, director, for
the appellant.
Ms Lucy Wilson-Barnes of
counsel instructed by Howes Percival & Co for the respondents.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2010
DECISION
1.
This
is an appeal against the respondents’ decision given in a letter dated 24
December 2008 to refuse the appellant’s claim for input tax in the sum of
£167,737.50 for the prescribed accounting period of three months ending October
2006.
2.
The
appellant was registered for VAT from 12 November 2000 and had traded in the
music industry as a promoter and distributor of copyright music, mostly in
Indian musical genres. Mr Vivek Nayar, a
director of the appellant, gave evidence on behalf of the appellant and
represented it at the hearing. Ms
Wilson-Barnes represented the respondents and called Ms Annette Edwards,
customs officer, as a witness. We also
read, as agreed evidence, statements from Mr Roderick Stone and Ms Bharti
Mistry and Mr Clive White of HMRC. Much
of the primary evidence was not disputed and consisted of documents relating to
the transactions in question in the appeal.
The issues in the appeal were mostly concerned with the inferences to be
drawn from the documents and the evidence of Mr Nayar. We were taken to those documents during the
hearing and have had regard to them in reaching our decision in the
appeal. The documents run to
approximately 700 pages.
3.
The
appeal is concerned with what was essentially a single transaction which the
appellant entered into at the end of October 2006. That transaction consisted of the sale of the
following goods to a Danish company called Nordisk Tradex ApS (Nordisk): 800
Merlin Portable Multimedia Players, 550 Clarion DVD Players, 650 Panasonic MP 3
Players and 500 Kenwood DDX. Those goods
were all purchased by the appellant from a
4.
Keycomp’s
purchase from Silver Pound was an acquisition from an EU trader and the appellant’s
sale to Nordisk was a dispatch to a trader in another EU country. All the other transactions were taxable
supplies in the
5.
The
respondents denied the appellant’s claim to deduct the input tax in dispute on
the ground that the transaction by which the appellant bought the goods from IT
which it then sold to Nordisk was one in respect of which it either knew or
should have known it was thereby participating in a transaction which was
connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT.
That principle is derived from the ECJ case of Kittel –v-
6.
Ms
Wilson-Barnes also referred us to the following authorities: Softwarecore Ltd –v- Pathan IHC 231/05, Commissioners of HMRC –v- Brayfal Ltd Ch/2008/APP
0082, Revenue and Customs
Commissioners –v- Livewire [2009]
EWHC 15 (Ch), Mobilx –v- Revenue and
Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 133 (Ch), Calltel Telecom Ltd –v- Commissioners for HMRC [2009] EWHC 1081
(Ch) and Blue Sphere Global Ltd –v- The
Commissioners for HMRC CH/2009/APP0066.
She also referred to the Tribunal
decisions in Dragon Futures Ltd (19831)
and Honeyfone Ltd (20667).
7.
On
the basis of those authorities Ms Wilson-Barnes accepted that the burden of
proof lay upon the respondents to show that there had been a tax loss and that
it was fraudulent and that the appellant’s transaction was connected with that
fraud. She contended that the burden of
proof lay upon the appellant so far as the question of knowledge of that fraud
is concerned. Some doubt about that
proposition might be occasioned by the judgment in the Blue Sphere case compared with that in the Brayfal case and Ms Wilson-Barnes fairly brought that to our
attention.
8.
We
have heard the evidence of both parties and have reached our decisions on the
basis of all the evidence. We have
reached a positive decision on the evidence we have heard and it is not
therefore necessary for us to determine on whom the burden of proof lay in any
particular respect.
9.
We
find the facts to be as follows.
10. The appellant
had traded at a fairly modest level in the prescribed accounting periods before
07/06 having achieved tax exclusive outputs of £6,573 for 10/05, £4,680 for
01/06 and £631 for 04/06.
11. In the period
ending July 2006 the outputs declared were £584,250 and that amount was made up
entirely of supplies to the EU. In fact
it was a single supply in which the appellant purchased goods, consisting of
750 Toshiba Laptop computers, from IT which it sold to La Parisienne du
Commerce (LPDC) in
12. The
circumstances of that transaction are relevant to this appeal though it is not
directly the subject matter of this appeal.
Mr Nayar’s evidence about it was as follows. Roma II had suffered from a decline in the
amount of business available to it in the music industry and so he had decided
to look into other types of trading, such as catering in the
13. Mr Nayar gave
evidence that IT Players had approached him to discuss “the export
business”. Both in his oral evidence and
when he had been interviewed by a customs officer on 24 October 2006, Mr
Nayar’s explanation of how the contact with IT first occurred was that he
assumed that Mr Tahir Butt of IT had got his contact details from a CD cover or
some such source as his companies (both the appellant and an associated
company) were very well known in the Indian music industry.
14. Mr Butt’s
proposal was that Roma II should help to finance a deal with LPDC which was an
existing customer of IT. Mr Butt
explained that IT could not finance the deal itself but wanted to make the
supply so as to keep its business relationship with LPDC in place. When Mr Nayar was cross examined about the
interview on 24 October he said he had not given the full explanation for why
the appellant had become involved in this deal.
He had been asked at the interview why the appellant needed to be
brought into the deal with IT when that company would be paid by LPDC just as
Roma II would be. Mr Nayar said when he
was cross examined that he had not given the answer he should have given to the
customs officer. He said that was
because he was a little bit confused by the questioning. He said he should have explained that the
reason IT needed finance, despite the fact that it would have been paid by LPDC,
was that it still needed to account for VAT to its supplier and would not
charge output tax to LPDC and “that’s the bit IT couldn’t fund at that time and
that’s what we were brought in as financiers (sic)”. In other words Mr Nayar was well aware that
the effect of a purchase of goods in the
15. Mr Nayar is a
very experienced businessman. He told us
that he was involved in a very large deal concerning a property transaction and
he had a long record of trading in the music industry. We also observed the assured manner in which
he gave evidence. We find it very
unlikely that he would have been confused when he was interviewed. His reply at the interview was that he could
not supply a reason for his company being involved in the transaction but he
accepted it did not make good business sense for IT to have involved his
company in the deal but he would contact them again and find out why they had
involved his company. In those
circumstances Mr Nayar must or at least ought to have been suspicious about why
a company with which he had never previously dealt had approached him with such
a proposal. The possibility that he had
been approached simply because his company’s details appeared on a CD label is
so unlikely as to raise a real question about the truthfulness of his evidence
about the transaction with IT as supplier and LPDC as purchaser.
16. Mr Nayar admitted
in the interview that he had made only basic checks about IT and LPDC
(confirming VAT numbers and certificates of incorporation and identity
evidence) before entering into the transaction and that the checks did not
include any about IT’s creditworthiness, which we consider is remarkable given
that the reason that company gave for involving the appellant in the deal at
all was its inability fully to fund the deal itself. Mr Nayar claimed that he had asked his
accountant what checks he should make and we consider it implausible that an
accountant would have recommended only basic checks in those circumstances.
17. Mr Nayar
explained that he had proposed that Roma II should buy the goods from IT’s
supplier but they refused to disclose their supplier and so instead Roma II
bought the goods from IT and sold to LPDC.
That transaction occurred in July 2006.
The value of the goods was £584,250 and that was the largest transaction
the appellant had been involved with.
18. During the
interview of 24 October the visiting officer informed Mr Nayar about MTIC fraud
and stressed the need for full due diligence checks and the need for serial
numbers of goods to be recorded. Mr
Nayar was also asked about current trading and he said no more deals had been
done or were planned for that month though he was intending to go to
19. HMRC were considering
cancelling the appellant’s VAT registration on the ground that it was no longer
trading and Mr Nayar knew that, so he had a good incentive for telling the
officer who visited about the negotiations in September and October, even if
they had not materialised into actual sales by the time of the interview. Those facts are therefore further evidence
that he was uneasy about the transaction under appeal even before it happened.
20. Mr Nayar stated
in evidence that, in
21. Mr Nayar said Mr
Kalsi wanted 800 Merlins and on 30 October IT told Mr Nayar in a fax message
that they were hoping to secure stock consisting of Merlin MP4 players. Mr Nayar then phoned Mr Kalsi and said there
was a possibility he could supply the 800 Merlins (though no evidence was
produced that showed IT had said how many they expected to be able to supply
until the next day). Mr Kalsi asked if
he could be supplied with other items being Kenwood Clarion and Panasonic
players. Mr Nayar said he passed that
information to IT and they said they could supply most of what had been
requested but not as many of the Kenwood and Clarion items as Mr Nayar was
seeking for Mr Kalsi. We take it from
that evidence that Mr Kalsi must have specified the numbers he wanted.
22. IT informed Mr
Nayar that they would then be able to supply all the goods requested including
those which had previously been unavailable.
Not only that, but all the goods were available at the same freight
forwarder’s premises. The freight
forwarder was AFI Logistics and the goods were at their Southall premises.
23. We have mentioned
in paragraph 3 above how these goods were part of a chain of transactions
leading back to Keycomp Ltd. The
appellant did not deal with Keycomp Ltd.
We are satisfied by the evidence of Ms Bharti Mistry (customs officer)
that Keycomp failed to account for output tax on the goods in question in this
case when it sold them to PCB 2 Ltd (IT’s supplier) and that that failure to
account was fraudulent.
24. Ms Mistry’s
evidence was not disputed by the appellant and was as follows.
25. Keycomp was
incorporated on 3 October 2005 and registered for VAT from 24 March 2006. When it registered for VAT, Keycomp stated
its main business activity was the wholesale of electrical equipment and in its
VAT returns for 05/06 and 08/06 it made small repayment claims (£214.48 and
£185.76 respectively). On 6 November
2006 HMRC received notification that Keycomp had imported mobile phones from
26. HMRC then issued
a direction to Keycomp shortening the period for which it was to make a return
and payment and Keycomp then claimed that it had cancelled the transactions
relevant to this appeal because PCB 2 had not paid for the goods. Whether PCB 2 paid for the goods or not, it
was untrue that the transaction had been cancelled and Keycomp’s directors must
have known that was untrue, because release notes had been issued to AFI
Logistics to allow the goods to be transferred to PCB 2. It is possible that PCB 2 owed Keycomp a debt
but the transaction had already occurred.
Thereafter Keycomp changed its address and its director became
untraceable despite HMRC’s attempts to trace him. An assessment of £941,238 was issued and
remains unpaid. The output tax in
respect of the first
27. We are satisfied
that the evidence proves that Keycomp’s non-payment of VAT was fraudulent.
28. The salient
facts about the transaction so far as the appellant’s involvement are as
follows.
29. The transaction
took place very soon after Mr Nayar had been warned, at the interview on 24
October, about the risks of transactions being connected with MTIC fraud and
the need, so far as HMRC were concerned, for due diligence checks to be
thorough. Whilst we accept that HMRC
have no right to insist on due diligence checks, what a trader does about
making enquiries about the bona fides of transactions is certainly potentially
relevant to the question whether that trader was a person who knew or should
have known that a transaction was connected with fraud.
30. Mr Nayar said he
had carried out VAT number checks and evidence of incorporation of his supplier
and purchaser and AFI Logistics but some of the other due diligence checks were
plainly worthless, such as a reference from a builder and decorator for IT, or
more a cause for concern than a recommendation, such as a checkSURE report on
IT saying it had above average risk and had a recommended credit limit of
zero. The due diligence about Nordisk
consisted of registration details and self certified assertions and some
documents in Danish which Mr Nayar admitted he cannot speak.
31. This is not a
case where the appellant could claim it had no cause to be concerned about the
creditworthiness of its purchaser and supplier on the grounds that the goods
were not going to be released and the supplier was not going to be paid until
the appellant had been paid in full. The
appellant released the goods to Nordisk before that company had paid for the
goods and obtained possession and presumably title to the goods before it had
paid IT. It had been agreed that payment
by Nordisk was to be on 30 day terms so this was not a back to back transaction
and so there was a serious risk of non-payment which materialised.
32. Given that the
goods were also released before the inspection report had been obtained, the
appellant was taking a risk about IT’s creditworthiness because, had the goods
turned out to be defective or not in accordance with the specification, the
appellant could well have faced a claim against it by Nordisk and to have
needed to recover damages from IT.
33. Mr Nayar had
requested a 100% inspection of the goods and this was purportedly carried out
by A1 Inspections, though it seems likely Mr Nayar did not know that, as he had
instructed AFI Logistics to carry it out and that company had sub-contracted it
to A1. Whoever carried the inspection
out, in so far as it was carried out, it must have been a cursory inspection
given the number of items (2,500) and the time involved (certainly within the
31 October during ordinary working hours) - according to PCB 2 Ltd’s stock
offer to IT the price quoted was only available up to 5.30pm so the whole deal
must have been completed by that time.
Mr Nayar produced a series of faxes dated 31 October instructing AFI to
make 100% inspections. Contrary to the
usual practice these faxes do not show the time they were sent but they had
attached to them the allocation notes from IT by which IT instructed AFI to
allocate the goods on hold to the appellant.
The inspection must therefore have been ordered after the deal had been
otherwise agreed. The appellant did not
order the goods formally from IT until it had agreed to sell them to Nordisk
according to Mr Nayar’s evidence so that proves that the inspection must have
been ordered after the deal had been agreed.
34. In fact the deal
then went ahead without Mr Nayar having received the inspection reports and Mr
Nayar has refused to pay AFI because of that.
The goods were not in fact sent to
35. No detailed
terms of business were agreed either with the appellant’s supplier or purchaser
and the descriptions of the goods on the invoices did not supply the detail
that might be expected for a deal worth £1,015,935. Given the value of the goods and the lack of
an existing trading relationship with Nordisk and the limited relationship with
IT it is significant that such terms were lacking and Mr nayar must have
realised that.
36. Mr Nayar
stressed that because the owners of Nordisk were from his family community
there was a circle of trust between them and so he did not need to worry about
such questions as the lack of due diligence and the lack of precise terms of
business. However he admitted that no
such circumstance applied between him and IT and we assume no such circumstances
applied between him and AFI Logistics.
37. When Nordisk
failed to pay the appellant in accordance with the agreement the appellant also
failed to pay IT but that company took little if any action about that and had
not even been paid in full at the time of appeal.
38. The appellant
achieved very close to a 6% mark up for each of the types of goods dealt with
in the transaction in question despite the variety of goods and values involved
in the separate parcels of goods.
39. We derive the
following conclusions about this appeal from the evidence as a whole and we
will set out some of the more important aspects of our reasoning.
40. It is a
remarkable feature of this case that the appellant was able to supply goods
exactly according to his customer’s requirements within a very short time
despite the fact that at first it seemed he might not be able to source them
all. It then turned out that all the
goods were already in the physical custody of the same freight forwarder
including those that had been sourced at the last minute.
41. Mr Nayar, despite
his obvious intelligence in business matters and his wide experience in
business, entered into the largest deal he had ever conducted, in a sector of
the economy which was new to him, with a supplier he barely knew (and who, he
asserted, had approached him only shortly before this deal in unexplained
circumstances) and a purchaser with whom he had never dealt before. He did so without making much in the way of
enquiries of either counterparty and ignoring negative information about the
creditworthiness of his company’s supplier.
The transaction was conducted without any detailed terms of business and
with only the sketchiest description of the goods and effectively no inspection
or examination of the goods. We regard
the instructions for a 100% inspection of the goods as having been made purely
for appearance sake not only because such an inspection could not reasonably
have been expected to have been carried out in the time available anyway but
also because the deal went ahead without it.
42. We find that Mr Nayar deliberately withheld
information in two important respects when he was interviewed in October. He failed to mention that he had had
discussions about another deal in electrical goods, as we have found in
paragraph 17 above, and he failed to disclose the details of why he entered
into the first deal with IT, as we have found in paragraph 14. We have already found that those facts show
an uneasiness on Mr Nayar’s part about the deal the appellant was about to
enter into.
43. Mr Nayar had a
good deal of knowledge about the existence of MTIC fraud before he entered into
the transaction in question. HMRC had
written to Roma II Ltd on 16 August 2006 specifically referring to MTIC fraud
relating to “all types of VAT standard rated goods and services including
computer equipment, mobile phones and ancillary equipment” and specifying a
wide range of due diligence which should be obtained. Only a few days before the transaction in
question, at the interview already referred to, Mr Nayar had asked the officer
who visited him what HMRC were doing about fraudulent trading and what
penalties were applicable and he had referred to “arrests, sentences and
recovery of asset cases which had been in the press”. The note of the interview also records that
the officer discussed how a business could have the “means of knowledge” to
assess the possible risk of entering into certain deals and noted that Mr Nayar
“appeared to understand the implications”.
MTIC fraud was clearly in his mind at that time and clearly must still
have been in his mind when six days later he started to negotiate about the
transaction in question and when on the next day he entered into it.
44. We have no doubt
that a person of Mr Nayar’s knowledge, ability and experience in business
should have known that this transaction was connected with VAT fraud. The circumstances in which he was asked to
supply the goods and the lack of commerciality of the transaction involving the
sale of high value goods with minimal formality and with no assurance either
from the supplier or to the purchaser that the goods were up to specification
and the ease with which the transaction was effected all point to only one
conclusion. Add to that Mr Nayar’s lack
of candour in the interview and the case becomes compelling.
45. We hold that the
transaction was one that was connected with fraud and that Mr Nayar, and
therefore the appellant, should have known that was the case and it follows
that the appellant has thereby lost its right to the input tax claimed and the
appeal is dismissed.
46. The
Commissioners seek an award of costs and we direct that the appellant is to pay
the costs of and occasioned by this appeal to be assessed by the High Court if
not agreed between the parties